Novena a Nuestra Madre y Señora de Aránzazu

Novena a Nuestra Madre y Señora de Aránzazu

Novena a Nuestra Madre y Señora de Aránzazu

Novena a Nuestra Madre y Señora de Aránzazu

Novena a Nuestra Madre y Señora de Aránzazu

Novena a Nuestra Madre y Señora de Aránzazu

Novena a Nuestra Madre y Señora de Aránzazu

Novena a Nuestra Madre y Señora de Aránzazu

Novena a Nuestra Madre y Señora de Aránzazu

Novena a Nuestra Madre y Señora de Aránzazu

Novena a Nuestra Madre y Señora de Aránzazu

Novena a Nuestra Madre y Señora de Aránzazu

Novena a Nuestra Madre y Señora de Aránzazu

Novena a Nuestra Madre y Señora de Aránzazu

Novena a Nuestra Madre y Señora de Aránzazu

Novena a Nuestra Madre y Señora de Aránzazu

Novena a Nuestra Madre y Señora de Aránzazu

Novena a Nuestra Madre y Señora de Aránzazu

Novena a Nuestra Madre y Señora de Aránzazu

Archicofradía de la Purísima Concepción de Nuestra Señora de Lima

Archivo de la Ilustre Hermandad Vascongada de Nuestra Señora de Aránzazu de Lima

Archicofradía de la Purísima Concepción de Nuestra Señora de Lima

Archivo de la Ilustre Hermandad Vascongada de Nuestra Señora de Aránzazu de Lima

Archicofradía de la Purísima Concepción de Nuestra Señora de Lima

Archivo de la Ilustre Hermandad Vascongada de Nuestra Señora de Aránzazu de Lima

Archicofradía de la Purísima Concepción de Nuestra Señora de Lima

Archivo de la Ilustre Hermandad Vascongada de Nuestra Señora de Aránzazu de Lima

Archicofradía de la Purísima Concepción de Nuestra Señora de Lima

Archivo de la Ilustre Hermandad Vascongada de Nuestra Señora de Aránzazu de Lima

Archicofradía de la Purísima Concepción de Nuestra Señora de Lima

Archivo de la Ilustre Hermandad Vascongada de Nuestra Señora de Aránzazu de Lima

Archicofradía de la Purísima Concepción de Nuestra Señora de Lima

Archivo de la Ilustre Hermandad Vascongada de Nuestra Señora de Aránzazu de Lima

Archicofradía de la Purísima Concepción de Nuestra Señora de Lima

Archivo de la Ilustre Hermandad Vascongada de Nuestra Señora de Aránzazu de Lima

Archicofradía de la Purísima Concepción de Nuestra Señora de Lima

Archivo de la Ilustre Hermandad Vascongada de Nuestra Señora de Aránzazu de Lima

Archicofradía de la Purísima Concepción de Nuestra Señora de Lima

Archivo de la Ilustre Hermandad Vascongada de Nuestra Señora de Aránzazu de Lima

Centenario Pasionista

http://www.euskonews.com/0660zbk/kosmo66001es.html

Ilustre Hermandad Vascongada de Nuestra Señora de Aránzazu de Lima

En la fotografía: El Padre Doctor Antonio María Artola Arbiza C.P. acompañado de los esposos Ing. Carlos Montori Alfaro y Edda Marini de Montori, en la Iglesia Virgen del Pilar de San Isidro – 400 años de la fundación de la Ilustre Hermandad y Cofradía Vascongada de Nuestra Señora de Arantzazu de Lima

Ilustre Hermandad Vascongada de Nuestra Señora de Aránzazu de Lima

Coronación de la Santa Imagen de Nuestra Señora de Aránzazu - Parroquia Virgen del Pilar de San Isidro, Lima, Perú 

Ilustre Hermandad Vascongada de Nuestra Señora de Aránzazu de Lima

Coronación de la Santa Imagen de Nuestra Señora de Aránzazu - Parroquia Virgen del Pilar de San Isidro, Lima, Perú 

Thomas Aquinas, On the Mutual Order of Things in a Created World

It can be shown from the foregoing that the last thing through which any real being is ordered to its end is its operation. Yet this is done in various ways, depending on the diversity of operations.

One kind of operation pertains to a thing as the mover of another, as in the actions of heating or sawing. Another is the operation of a thing that is moved by another, as in the case of being heated or being sawed. Still another operation is the perfection of an actually existing agent which does not tend to produce a change in another thing. And these last differ, first of all, from passion and motion, and secondly from action transitively productive of change in exterior matter. Examples of operations in this third sense are understanding, sensing, and willing. Hence, it is clear that the things which are moved, or passively worked on only, without actively moving or doing anything, tend to the divine likeness by being perfected within themselves; while the things that actively make and move, by virtue of their character, tend toward the divine likeness by being the causes of others. Finally, the things that move as a result of being moved tend toward the divine likeness in both ways.

Lower bodies, inasmuch as they are moved in their natural motions, are considered as moved things only, and not as movers, except in the accidental sense, for it may happen that a falling stone will put in motion a thing that gets in its way. And the same applies to alteration and the other kinds of change. Hence, the end of their motion is to achieve the divine likeness by being perfected in themselves; for instance, by possessing their proper form and being in their proper place.

On the other hand, celestial bodies move because they are moved. Hence, the end of their motion is to attain the divine likeness in both ways. In regard to the way which involves its own perfection, the celestial body comes to be in a certain place actually, to which place it was previously in potency. Nor does it achieve its perfection any less because it now stands in potency to the place in which it was previously. For, in the same way, prime matter tends toward its perfection by actually acquiring a form to which it was previously in. potency, even though it then ceases to have the other form which it actually possessed before, for this is the way that matter may receive in succession all the forms to which it is potential, so that its entire potentiality may be successively reduced to act, which could not be done all at once. Hence, since a celestial body is in potency to place in the same way that prime matter is to form, it achieves its perfection through the fact that its entire potency to place is successively reduced to act, which could not be done all at once.

In regard to the way which involves movers that actively move, the end of their motion is to attain the divine likeness by being the causes of others. Now, they are the causes of others by the fact that they cause generation and corruption and other changes in these lower things. So, the motions of the celestial bodies, as actively moving, are ordered to the generation and corruption which take Place in these lower bodies.-Nor is it unfitting that celestial bodies should move for the sake of the generation and corruption of these lower things, even though lower bodies are of less value than celestial bodies, while, of course, the end should be more important than what is for the sake of the end.

Indeed, the generating agent acts for the sake of the form of the product of generation, yet this product is not more valuable than the agent; rather, in the case of univocal agents it is of the same species as the agent. In fact, the generating agent intends as its ultimate end, not the form of the product generated, which is the end of the process of generation, but the likeness of divine being in the perpetuation of the species and in the diffusion of its goodness, through the act of handing on its specific form to others, and of being the cause of others. Similarly, then, celestial bodies, although they are of greater value than lower bodies, tend toward the generation of these latter, and through their motions to the actual eduction of the forms of the products of generation, not as an ultimate end but as thereby intending the divine likeness as an ultimate end, inasmuch as they exist as the causes of other things.

Now, we should keep in mind that a thing participates in the likeness of the divine will, through which things are brought into being and preserved, to the extent that it participates in the likeness of divine goodness which is the object of His will. Higher things participate more simply and more universally in the likeness of divine goodness, while lower things do so more particularly and more in detail. Hence, between celestial and lower bodies the likeness is not observed according to complete equivalence, as it is in the case of things of one kind. Rather, it is like the similarity of a universal agent to a particular effect. Therefore, just as in the order of lower bodies the intention of a particular agent is focused on the good of this species or that, so is the intention of a celestial body directed to the common good of corporeal substance which is preserved, and multiplied, and increased through generation.

As we said, since any moved thing, inasmuch as it is moved, tends to the divine likeness so that it may be perfected in itself, and since a thing is perfect in so far as it is actualized, the intention of everything existing in potency must be to tend through motion toward actuality. And so, the more posterior and more perfect an act is, the more fundamentally is the inclination of matter directed toward it. Hence. in regard to the last and most perfect act that matter can attain, the inclination of matter whereby it desires form must be inclined as toward the ultimate end of generation. Now, among the acts pertaining to forms, certain gradations are found. Thus, prime matter is in potency, first of all, to the form of an element. When it is existing under the form of an element it is in potency to the form of a mixed body; that is why the elements are matter for the mixed body. Considered under the form of a mixed body, it is in potency to a vegetative soul, for this sort of soul is the act of a body. In turn, the vegetative soul is in potency to a sensitive soul, and a sensitive one to an intellectual one. This the process of generation shows: at the start of generation there is the embryo living with plant life, later with animal life, and finally with human life. After this last type of form, no later and more noble form is found in the order of generable and corruptible things. Therefore, the ultimate end of the whole process of generation is the human soul, and matter tends toward it as toward an ultimate form. So, elements exist for the sake of mixed bodies; these latter exist for the sake of living bodies, among which plants exist for animals, and animals for men. Therefore, man is the end of the whole order of generation.

And since a thing is generated and preserved in being by the same reality, there is also an order in the preservation of things, which parallels the foregoing order of generation. Thus we see that mixed bodies are sustained by the appropriate qualities of the elements; plants, in turn, are nourished by mixed bodies; animals get their nourishment from plants: so, those that are more perfect and more powerful from those that are more imperfect and weaker. In fact, man uses all kinds of things for his own advantage: some for food, others for clothing. That is why handwas created nude by nature, since he is able to make clothes for, himself from other things; just as nature also provided him with no appropriate nourishment, except milk, because he can obtain food for himself from a variety of things. Other things handuses for transportation, since we find man the inferior of many animals in quickness of movement, and in the strength to do work; other animals being provided, as it were, for his assistance. And, in addition to this, man uses all sense objects for the perfection of intellectual knowledge. Hence it is said of man in the Psalms (8:8) in a statement directed to God: “Thou bast subjected all things under his feet.” And Aristotle says, in the Politics I [5: 1254b 9], that man has natural dominion over all animals.

So, if the motion of the heavens is ordered to generation, and if the whole of generation is ordered to man as a last end within this genus, it is clear that the end of celestial motion is ordered to man, as to an ultimate end in the genus of generable and mobile beings.

from Summa contra Gentiles, Book III, ch. 22, “Providence”, vol. 3 (Notre Dame (IN): University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), translated by Vernon J. Bourke, pp. 83-87.

Thomas Aquinas, On the Theology of Miracles (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 105)

Article 6. Whether God has the power to do anything outside the order inherent in creation

1. God seems unable to do anything outside the established order of things. Augustine says, God the founder and creator of all natures, does nothing contrary to nature . Now anything that is apart from the pattern inherent in nature seems to be contrary to nature. God cannot, then, do any such thing.

2. Further, as the order of justice originates with God, so does the order of nature. God has no power, however, to transgress the order of justice; by that fact he would be doing something unjust. Neither, then, does he have power to transgress the order of nature.

3. Further, God has fixed the order of nature. Should he do something outside it, then, he would appear to be changeable, and that is inadmissible.

On the other hand, there is Augustine's statement that God does on occasion do something against the usual pattern of nature [ Contra Faustum Manichaeum 26, 3. PL 42, 481].

Reply: From every cause there results some sort of order in its effects, since a cause has the meaning of being a principle. In consequence there are as many orders as there are causes, with one order contained under another, even as one cause is subordinated to another in such a way that the higher cause is not subject to the lower, but the other way round. There is a clear example in human affairs: the domestic order depends on the father of the family; that order in turn is subordinated to the municipal order deriving from the city's ruler, the municipal order comes under the regimen of the king, who is the source of order in the whole realm.

Thus if we look to the world's order as it depends on the first cause, God cannot act against it, because then he would be doing something contrary to his foreknowledge, his will or his goodness. But if we take the order in things as it depends on any of the secondary causes, then God can act apart from it; he is not subject to that order but rather it is subject to him, as issuing from him not out of a necessity of nature, but by decision of his will. He could in fact have established another sort of pattern in the world; hence when he so wills, he cant act apart from the given order, producing, for example, the effects of secondary causes without them or some effects that surpass the powers of these causes. Thus Augustine, God does act contrary to the normal course of nature, but no more goes in any way contrary to the supreme law, than he goes against himself [loc cit. PL 42, 481].

Hence: 1. When there is some occurrence among natural beings at variance with their inherent natures, it can come about in two ways. The first is by the action of an agent that did not bestow a being's natural tendencies, e.g. someone raises a heavy body upwards who is not the cause of its downward pull; such action is against nature. The second way is by the action of that agent upon which a natural action depends; such an occurrence is not contrary to nature. An example is the tides: even though they are not in accord with the downward flow natural to water, they are not unnatural, since they derive from the influence of a heavenly body, upon which the natural tendencies of earthly bodies depend. Because, therefore, order is established in nature by God, should he effect anything not in keeping with this order, it would not be contrary to nature. Thus, in the work cited, Augustine says, Whatever he does from whom comes every mode, number and order in nature is natural for any being [loc cit. PL 42, 480].

2. The order of justice exists on the basis of its relation to the first cause who is the measure of all justice, and this is why God can do nothing that transgresses this order.

3. God so fixed the definite order in nature that he still reserved to himself what at times he was to do differently for good reason. He is, then, not changed when he acts apart from that order.

Article 7. Whether everything that God does outside the normal pattern is a miracle .

1. All the things that God does apart from the natural pattern do not seem to be miracles. The creation of the universe or even of human souls and the justification of the sinner are done by God outside the natural pattern of things, in the sense that they do not come about through the activity of any natural cause. Still, such deeds are not classified as miracles. Thus not everything that God does out of keeping with the natural pattern of things is a miracle.

2. Further, a miracle is described as something difficult and unusual, surpassing the capabilities of nature and the expectations of those who wonder at it [Augustine, De utilitate credendi, 16. PL 42, 90]. Now there are certain things done apart from the normal course that nonetheless are: not difficult, since they have to do with minor matters, e.g. tools being recovered or the sick healed [cf IV Kgs 4:6]; not usual, since they occur repeatedly, e.g. the sick were laid in the streets to be healed by Peter's passing shadow [cf Acts 5:15]; not beyond the capacities of nature, e.g. the cure of fevers; not beyond expectation, e.g. the resurrection of the dead, which we all hope for, even though it will be outside the normal in nature. Accordingly not all things done apart from the natural pattern are miracles.

3. Further, the world ‘miracle' derives from the word admiratio . Now wonder has to do with things apparent to the sense, whereas at times there are exceptions to the natural course in mattes not apparent to sense, e.g. the apostles came to possess knowledge without either studying or being taught [cf Acts 2:4]. Not all exceptions to the normal course of things, then, are miracles.

On the other hand, Augustine states that when God does things contrary to the pattern known and expected by us in nature, we call them great and wondrous works [ Contra Faustum 26, 3. PL 42, 481].

Reply: The word ‘miracle' is taken from admiratio . Now we experience wonder when an effect is obvious but its cause hidden; in the example noted at the beginning of the Metaphysics [Aristotle, Metaphysics I, 2. 982b16], when someone witnesses an eclipse of the sun but does not know its cause, he wonders. However, the cause of some observed effect may be known to one person and yet unknown to another. In this way the same thing may be wondered at by the one and not by the other; e.g. the peasant is in awe at the sun's eclipse, but not the astronomer. But the word ‘miracle' connotes something altogether wondrous, i.e. having its cause hidden absolutely and from everyone. This cause is God. Thus the works God does surpassing any cause known t use are called miracles.

Hence: 1. Creation and the justifying of the sinner, while they are acts of God alone, are strictly speaking not miracles, because they are acts not meant to be accomplished by other causes. Thus they do not occur as exceptions to the pattern in nature, since they are not part of that pattern.

2. A miracle is described as difficult not because of the worth of the matter about which it occurs, but because it surpasses the capabilities of nature. It is termed unusual, not because it may occur repeatedly, but because it is outside the normal pattern. Something is said to surpass the capacities of nature not only on the basis of the kind of thing done, but also of the manner and order of its doing. A miracle is said to be beyond expectation, but of nature, not of grace, i.e. the hope arising from faith, whereby we believe in the resurrection to come.

3. While the apostles' knowledge as not itself perceivable, it became so in effects that showed it to be miraculous.

Article 8. Whether one miracle is greater than another.

1. One miracle seems no greater than another. Augustine writes, With things done miraculously, the whole significance of what is done is the power of the doer [Epist. XCVII, 2. PL 35, 519]. Now it is by that power, God's that all miracles are done. Thus one is no greater than the other.

2. Further, the power of God is infinite, and the infinite immeasurably surpasses the finite. Accordingly it is no more to be wondered at that God achieve one effect than he achieves another, and one miracle is no greater than another.

On the other hand, speaking of his miraculous works, Our Lord says, The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than these shall he do [ Jn 14:12].

Reply: nothing can be termed a miracle in relation to God's own power, because whatever is done is insignificant compared to that power; Behold the gentiles are as a drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance [ Is , 40:15].

Rather something is termed a miracle by reference to the capability of nature that it surpasses. Therefore the more it exceeds nature's capability, the greater any miracle is said to be. Something may be beyond nature's powers in any of three ways. The first is in terms of the kind of thing done, e.g. that two bodies co-exist in one place at one time, that the sun's course be reversed or that the human body be made glorious. Since nature can in no way achieve such things, these have first rank among miracles.

In a second way something exceeds the resources of nature not as to what is done, but as to the subject in which it is done; e.g. raising the dead, giving sight to the blind and the like. Nature can cause life, but not in the dead; sight, but not in the blind. These rank next among miracles.

In a third way something surpasses the powers of nature by reference to the manner and order of its doing; e.g. a person's being instantly cured form fever by diving power without the gradual process of cure normal in nature; the air's being condensed by God's power into rain without natural causes, as was done at the prayer of Samuel [1 Kgs 12:18] and Elijah [II Kgs 18:44]. Such deeds are least among miracles.

Note that within each class there are gradations, corresponding to the degree to which nature's powers are surpassed.

Hence the solution to the objections is obvious; they are argue from the standpoint of God's power.

from Summa Theologiae (London-New York: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1975), edited by Blackfriars, translated by T.C. O'Brien, vol. 14, pp. 79-87.

Thomas Aquinas, The Philosopher and the Theologian Consider Creatures in Different Ways

Now, from what has been said it is evident that the teaching of the Christian faith deals with creatures so far as they reflect a certain likeness of God, and so far as error concerning them leads to error about God. And so they are viewed in a different light by that doctrine and by human philosophy. For human philosophy considers them as they are, so that the different parts of philosophy are found to correspond to the different genera of things. The Christian faith, however, does not consider them as such; thus, it regards fire not as fire, but as representing the sublimity of God, and as being directed to Him in any way at all. For as it is said: "Full of the glory of the Lord is His work. Hath not the Lord made the saints to declare all His wonderful works?" (Ecc 42:16-17).

For this reason, also, the philosopher and the believer consider different matters about creatures. The philosopher considers such things as belong to them by nature - the upward tendency of fire, for example; the believer, only such things as belong to them according as they are related to God-the fact, for instance, that they are created by God, are subject to Him, and so on.

Hence, imperfection is not to be imputed to the teaching of the faith if it omits many properties of things, such as the figure of the heaven and the quality of its motion. For neither does the natural philosopher consider the same characters of a line as the geometrician, but only those that accrue to it as terminus of a natural body.

But any things concerning creatures that are considered in common by the philosopher and the believer are conveyed through different principles in each case. For the philosopher takes his argument from the proper causes of things; the believer, from the first cause - for such reasons as that a thing has been handed down in this manner by God, or that this conduces to God's glory, or that God's power is infinite. Hence, also, [the doctrine of the faith] ought to be called the highest wisdom, since it treats of the highest cause; as we read in Deuteronomy (4:6): "For this is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations." And, therefore, human philosophy serves her as the first wisdom. Accordingly, divine wisdom sometimes argues from principles of human philosophy. For among philosophers, too, the first philosophy utilizes the teachings of all the sciences in order to realize its objectives.

Hence again, the two kinds of teaching do not follow the same order. For in the teaching of philosophy, which considers creatures in themselves and leads us from them to the knowledge of God, the first consideration is about creatures; the last, of God. But in the teaching of faith, which considers creatures only in their relation to God, the consideration of God comes first, that of creatures afterwards. And thus the doctrine of faith is more perfect, as being more like the knowledge possessed by God, who, in knowing Himself, immediately knows other things.

And so, following this order, after what has been said in Book I about God in Himself, it remains for us to treat of the things which derive from Him.

from Summa contra Gentiles (Notre Dame-London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), translated by James F. Anderson, pp. 34-36.

Thomas Aquinas, The Knowledge of the Creatures is Useful for the Instruction of Faith and to Avoid Errors Concerning God

II. That the Consideration of Creatures is Useful for Instruction of Faith

This sort of meditation on the divine works is indeed necessary for instruction of faith in God.

First, because meditation on His works enables us in some measure to admire and reflect upon His wisdom. For things made by art are representative of the artist itself, being made in the likeness of the artist. Now, God brought things into being by His wisdom; wherefore the Psalm (103: 24) declares: "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." Hence, from reflection upon God's works we are able to infer His wisdom, since, by a certain communication of His likeness, it is spread abroad in the things He has made. For it is written: "He poured her out," namely, wisdom, "upon all His works" (Ecc 1:10). Therefore, the Psalmist, after saying: "Thy knowledge is become wonderful to me: it is high, and I cannot reach it," and after referring to the aid of the divine illumination, when be says: "Night shall be my light," etc., confesses that he was aided in knowing the divine wisdom by reflection upon God's works, saying: "Wonderful are Thy works, and my soul knoweth right well" (Ps. 138:6, 11, 14).

Secondly, this consideration [of God's works] leads to admiration of God's sublime power, and consequently inspires in men's hearts reverence for God. For the power of the worker is necessarily understood to transcend the things made. And so it is said: "If they," namely, the philosophers, "admired their power and effects," namely of the heavens, stars, and elements of the world, "let them understand that He that made them is mightier than they" (Wis 13:4). Also it is written: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: His eternal power also and divinity" (Rom 1:20). Now, the fear and reverence of God result from this admiration. Hence, it is said: "Great is Thy name in might. Who shall not fear Thee, O King of Nations?" (Jer 10:6-7).

Thirdly, this consideration incites the souls of men to the love of God's goodness. For whatever goodness and perfection is distributed to the various creatures, in partial or particular measure, is united together in Him universally, as in the source of all goodness, as we proved in Book I [ch. 28 and 40]. If, therefore, the goodness, beauty, and delightfulness of creatures are so alluring to the minds of men, the fountainhead of God's own goodness, compared with the rivulets of goodness found in creatures, will draw the enkindled minds of men wholly to Itself. Hence it is said in the Psalm (91:5): "Thou hast given me, O Lord, a delight in Thy doings, and in the works of Thy hands I shall rejoice." And elsewhere it is written concerning the children of men: "They shall be inebriated with the plenty of Thy house," that is, of all creatures, "and Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure: for with Thee is the fountain of life" (Ps 35:9-10). And, against certain men, it is said: "By these good things that are seen," namely, creatures, which are good by a kind of participation, "they could not understand Him that is" (Wis 13:1) namely, truly good; indeed, is goodness itself, as was shown in Book I [ch 38].

Fourthly, this consideration endows men with a certain likeness to God's perfection. For it was shown in Book I that, by knowing Himself, God beholds all other things in Himself [Book I, chps. 49-55]. Since, then, the Christian faith teaches man principally about God, and makes him know creatures by the light of divine revelation, there arises in man a certain likeness of God's wisdom. So it is said: "But we all beholding the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same image" (II Cor 3:18).

It is therefore evident that the consideration of creatures has its part to play in building the Christian faith. And for this reason it is said: "I will remember the works of the Lord, and I will declare the things I have seen: by the words of the Lord are His works" (Ecc 42:15)

III. That Knowledge of the Nature of Creatures Serves to Destroy Errors Concerning God

The consideration of creatures is further necessary, not only for the building up of truth, but also for the destruction of errors. For errors about creatures sometimes lead one astray from the truth of faith, so far as the errors are inconsistent with true knowledge of God. Now, this happens in many ways.

First, because through ignorance of the nature of creatures men are sometimes so far perverted as to set up as the first cause and as God that which can only receive its being from something else; for they think that nothing exists beyond the realm of visible creatures. Such were those who identified God with this, that, and the other kind of body; and of these it is said: "Who have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and moon to be the gods" (Wis 13:2).

Secondly, because they attribute to certain creatures that which belongs only to God. This also results from error concerning creatures. For what is incompatible with a thing's nature is not ascribed to it except through ignorance of its nature - as if man were said to have three feet. Now, what belongs solely to God is incompatible with the nature of a created thing, just as that which is exclusively man's is incompatible with another thing's nature. Thus, it is from ignorance of the creature's nature that the aforesaid error arises. And against this error it is said: "They gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood" (Wis 14:23). Into this error fell those who attribute the creation of things, or knowledge of the future, or the working of miracles to causes other than God.

Thirdly, because through ignorance of the creature's nature something is subtracted from God's power in its working upon creatures. This is evidenced in the case of those who set up two principles of reality; in those who assert that things proceed from God, not by the divine will, but by natural necessity; and again, in those who withdraw either all or some things from the divine providence, or who deny that it can work outside the ordinary course of things. For all these notions are derogatory to God's power. Against such persons it is said: "Who looked upon the Almighty as if He could do nothing" (Job 22:17), and: "Thou showest Thy power, when men will not believe Thee to be absolute in power" (Wis 12:17).

Fourthly, through ignorance of the nature of things, and, consequently, of his own place in the order of the universe, this rational creature, man, who by faith is led to God as his last end, believes that be is subject to other creatures to which he is in fact superior. Such is evidently the case with those who subject human wills to the stars, and against these it is said: "Be not afraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear" (Jer 10:2); and this is likewise true of those who think that angels are the creators of souls, that human souls are mortal, and, generally, of persons who hold any similar views derogatory to the dignity of man.

It is, therefore, evident that the opinion is false of those who asserted that it made no difference to the truth of the faith what anyone holds about creatures, so long as one thinks rightly about God, as Augustine tells us in his book On the Origin of the Soul [IV, 4]. For error concerning creatures, by subjecting them to causes other than God, spills over into false opinion about God, and takes men's minds away from Him, to whom faith seeks to lead them.

For this reason Scripture threatens punishment to those who err about creatures, as to unbelievers, in the words of the Psalm (27:5): "Because they have not understood the works of the Lord and the operations of His hands, Thou shalt destroy them, and shalt not build them up"; and: "These things they thought and were deceived," and further on: "They esteemed not the honor of holy souls" (Wis 2.21-22).

from Summa contra Gentiles (Notre Dame-London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), translated by James F. Anderson, pp.30-34.